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IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE:
THE IMPACT OF COURT-ORDERED REFORM ON THE CITY OF
NEW YORK
I. INTRODUCTION

The latter half of this century has seen the emergence and expansion
of a unique breed of lawsuits which have resulted in state and federal
judges becoming increasingly involved in the implementation of public
policy.' These lawsuits, commonly referred to as institutional reform
litigation, have typically been initiated by advocates on behalf of various
groups, not for the purpose of monetary compensation, but to remedy
constitutional violations and effectuate long-term reform of policies and
conditions in public institutions. 2 Generally, disputes have centered on
alleged pervasive deficiencies within certain government-operated
institutions and programs, and the standards that government officials
should apply to remedy those conditions. 3
A significant amount of institutional reform litigation has been
instituted against the City of New York.4 Court decrees now govern a wide
array of City programs and policies. Federal and state judges have used
their decree power to achieve sweeping fundamental reform for groups
such as New York City's homeless, prisoners, disabled children,7
residents of public housing,' and welfare recipients. 9

1. Beginning in 1954 with Brown v. Boardof Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), courts
nationwide began to see the rise of this new type of lawsuit. See Karen Keeble, Judicial
Modificationof Consent Judgments in InstitutionalReform Litigation, 50 BROOK. L. REV.
657, 684 n.1 (1984).
2. See id. at 657; see also Stacey L. Murphy, Note, Modification of ConsentDecrees
in InstitutionalReform Litigation:A Return to the Swift Standard, 8 REV. LITIG. 203, 203
(1989).
3. See Colin S. Diver, The Judge as PoliticalPowerbroker:SuperintendingStructural
Change in Public Institutions, 65 VA. L. REV. 43, 50 (1979).
4. See infra notes 5-10. Today court decrees govern numerous City programs and
policies, including education, housing, welfare, and the homeless. See Diver, supra note

3, at 44.
5.
1981).
6.
7.
8.
9.

See Callahan v. Carey, Index No. 42582/79 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County Aug. 26,
See Benjamin v. Malcolm, 495 F. Supp. 1357 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
See Jose P. v. Ambach, 669 F.2d 865 (2d Cir. 1982).
See Escalera v. New York City Hous. Auth., 425 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1970).
See Jiggetts v. Grinker, 553 N.E.2d 570 (N.Y. 1990).
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Despite the benefits that accrue from institutional reform litigation, the
use of court decrees to resolve complex disputes between private citizens
and government institutions has presented numerous problems. Through
the use of court decrees, the courts have become entangled in the internal
workings of a number of City-run institutions. Many orders have resulted
in years, and in some cases decades, of ongoing litigation over the proper
enforcement of those orders."0 As this Note will discuss, courts have
engaged in tasks that are somewhat unfamiliar to them-for example, the
establishment of detailed performance standards for administrators, the
reordering of budgetary expenses, and the displacement of administrative
authority. "
This Note will explore and evaluate the impact that court-ordered
changes have had on New York City local government. Part II12 will
briefly discuss how a consent decree is formed. Part II113 will discuss the
impact that court orders have on the ability of the City to function
effectively and efficiently. Part IV 4 concludes that although in many
instances institutional reform litigation leads to the establishment of new
rights for those challenging the City's practices, decrees often have an
adverse impact on the City's ability to operate effectively. In many
instances, elected officials are constrained by the demands of the decree
and are often precluded from carrying out their responsibilities in a manner
they see fit.

II. FORMATION OF CONSENT DECREES
Typically, an institutional reform suit arises when a lawyer or
advocacy group brings an action against the City on behalf of an individual
or class of persons15 alleging that rights have been violated in some way,
seeking to establish new rights, or seeking to stop the implementation of
programs thought to be inappropriate. ' 6 Plaintiffs typically name a variety
of public officials, ranging from junior-level administrators to the mayor,

10. See Susan V. Demers, The Failuresof Litigation as a Tool for the Development
of Social Welfare Policy, 22 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 1009, 1015 (1995).

11.
12.
13.
14.

See Diver, supra note 3, at 44.
See infra notes 15-32 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 33-137 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 138-45 and accompanying text.

15. See Ross Sandier & David Schoenbrod, Government by Decree: The High Cost
of Letting Judges Make Policy, 1994 CITY J. 54, 54-55 (1994). Many cases are brought

under the class action device because the interests of large numbers of people are often at
stake. See Diver, supra note 3, at 67.
16. See Demers, supra note 10, at 1009.
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as defendants.' 7 While some suits have focused upon upholding federal or
state constitutional rights,'" the majority seek to enforce rights guaranteed
to citizens under federal, state, or local statutes or regulations.1 9 If the
plaintiffs succeed in establishing that the City has violated their rights, the
court imposes a remedy.2 ° Such relief can be issued in the form of a
preliminary injunction; 21 more typically, however, the remedy takes the
form of a consent decree or settlement agreement.' Courts in New York
State will issue a preliminary injunction if it is shown (1) that the plaintiff
will suffer irreparable harm unless the policy or practice sought to be
enjoined is immediately terminated, and (2) that the balance of equities lies
in the plaintiff's favor. 23 The purpose of such a remedy is to "maintain the
status quo . . until a full development of the facts and the law can be
undertaken, usually through a trial." 24
A consent decree is formed when the court approves an agreement
negotiated by the parties, 25 or when an order is issued by the court with the
consent of the parties.2 6 Most decrees aimed at changing public policy
involve some negotiation between the parties who have a more intimate
knowledge of the institution or program than the judge, who has limited

17. See Diver, supra note 3, at 70.
18. See, e.g., Marisol A. v. Giuliani, 929 F. Supp. 662, 669 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(Plaintiffs were neglected and abused children who brought suit against officials responsible
for New York City's Administration for Children's Services, alleging that due to the
mishandling of their cases they were deprived of their rights under the U.S. Constitution,
the New York State Constitution, and various federal and state statutes.).
19.

See Sandler & Schoenbrod, Government by Decree, supra note 15, at 54-55.

20. See id. at 55. In some cases the court has imposed a remedy without a finding of
wrongdoing by the City. See id.
21. See, e.g., McCain v. Koch, 511 N.E.2d 62 (N.Y. 1987) (challenging the City's
policy of providing emergency housing for homeless families, the court issued a preliminary
injunction against the City, requiring City officials to provide safe and adequate emergency
housing assistance.).
22. See Lloyd C. Anderson, Implementation of Consent Decrees in StructuralReform

Litigation, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 725, 726 (1986).
23. See Demers, supra note 10, at 1016.
24.

Id.

25. See Judith Resnik, Judging Consent, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL. F. 43, 45 (1987)
(noting that the judge typically writes "so ordered" on the decree and signs his or her
name); Anderson, supra note 22, at 725-26 (stating that "the court either signs the
agreement or enters a separate order that requires the parties tocomply with the settlement
agreement").
26. See Demers, supra note 10, at 1016.
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knowledge about the functioning of public institutions.2 7 Often, there are
no findings that constitutional rights have been violated, nor is there an
admission of wrongdoing by the City. 28 This is primarily because the City,
in an effort to avoid protracted legal proceedings, usually chooses not to
challenge the relief sought by the plaintiff, and instead negotiates a
settlement that is in the best interest of both parties.29
Although the parties typically play a significant role in negotiating a
settlement, the task confronting a judge who is presiding over an
institutional reform case is not necessarily an easy one. Before approving
a settlement, or alternately, issuing its own remedy, the court has the heavy
burden of balancing the rights and interests of an aggrieved plaintiff against
"institutional requirements and limited [city] resources to reach a
compromise that provides adequate30 constitutional protection within
functional institutional frameworks.
The use of consent decrees as a mechanism to resolve disputes does
have benefits over customary forms of relief. In numerous ways, the use
of consent decrees "offer[s] genuine promise for a higher quality of justice
at less cost than the parties could achieve through traditional
adjudication." 31 In particular, through the use of negotitaion, the parties
are able to save time and costs, and can avoid some of the risks normally
associated with a full trial on the merits.3 2
III. IMPACT OF DECREES ON CITY OPERATIONS

A. Separation of Powers-Implementation ofDecree Leads to Excessive
JudicialInvolvement
In New York City, the outcome in a suit seeking institutional reform
has typically been a comprehensive decree that covers practically every
aspect of the conditions that shape the particular institutional life.33 The
mandates imposed by the decree usually entail very detailed enumerations
27. See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in PublicLaw Litigation, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1281, 1299 (1976); see, e.g., Callahan v. Carey, Index No. 42582/79 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1979) (decree states that there had been no "final adjudication of any issue of fact
or law . . ").
28. See Demers, supra note 10, at 1016.
29. See Sandler & Schoenbrod, Government by Decree, supra note 15, at 55, 58

(discussing reasons why the City agrees to consent decrees).
30. Keeble, supra note 1,at 683.
31. Anderson, supra note 22, at 727.
32. See Resnik, supra note 25, at 43.
33. See Eric A. Rosand, Consent Decrees in Welfare Litigation: The Obstacles to
Compliance, 28 COLUM. J.L.. & SOC. PROBS. 83, 84 (1994).
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of the City's obligations and the manner in which they must be
performed. 4 The decrees are extensive in nature and often encompass not
a few acts, but rather a complete range of conduct.35 The City's
obligations under the decrees are complex and can usually only be
performed over a long period of time.3 6 Therefore, judicial involvement
does not cease when a judgment is entered.37 Rather, the detailed nature
of the decree and implementation requirements often produce a system
whereby the particular City agency is subject to continuous judicial
oversight. 38 The court thus becomes an active participant in the City's
affairs, largely because supervising the decree's implementation is essential
to ensure compliance. 39 In some instances, in its efforts to implement and
enforce the decree, the court essentially supplants the City as manager of
public institutions.4" In this capacity, "a judge moves far beyond the

normal competence and authority of a judicial officer, into an arena where
legal aspirations, bureaucratic possibilities, and political constraints
converge, and where ordinary legal rules frequently are inapplicable."'
For the City, this need for ongoing supervision has often meant the loss of
administrative control and the loss of the ability to supervise its agencies
and programs.4'
Numerous commentators have attacked institutional reform litigation
as damaging to the democratic process.4 3 Judges are viewed as intruders
in performing such functions as allocating social resources, a role
traditionally viewed as primarily legislative.' It has been said that decrees

34.

See Donald L. Horowitz, Decreeing OrganizationalChange: JudicialSupervision

of Public Institutions, 1983 DUKE L.J. 1265, 1267 (1983).
35. See id.
36. See Sandier & Schoenbrod, Government by Decree, supra note 15, at 55.
Typically, the decrees do not specify an expiration date; however, they may contain
milestone dates against which to measure the rate at which the City is complying. See id.
37. See Diver, supra note 3, at 51-52 ("Promulgation of the decree [does] not
terminate the litigation, but instead ...initiate[s] a process of enforcement extending into
the indefinite future.").
38. See Special Project: The Remedial Process in InstitutionalReform Litigation, 78
COLUM. L. REV. 788, 815 (1978) [hereinafter Special Project].
39. See Michael S. Lottman, Enforcement of JudicialDecrees:Now Comes the Hard
Part, 1 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. 69, 69 (1976).
40. See Horowitz, supra note 34, at 1267.
41. William A. Fletcher, The Discretionary Constitution: IstitutionalRemedies &
JudicialLegitimacy, 91 YALE L.J. 635, 641 (1982).
42. See Sandier & Schoenbrod, Government By Decree, supra note 15, at 55 (noting
that the court "continues to manage the City's shelter system in exquisite detail").
43. See Ross Sandier & David Schoenbrod, Statute Promises Local Relief from
OverbearingJudges, TAMPA TRIB., Dec. 8, 1996, at 6.
44. See Theodore Eisenberg & Stephen C. Yeazell, The Ordinary and the
Extraordinaryin InstitutionalLitigation, 93 HARV. L. REV. 465, 506 (1980).
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that control areas of municipal policy "undercut democracy and allocate
huge chunks [of the City] budget[s] for policies that elected officials
haven't chosen."'4 5 Under the federal and state constitutions, elected46
officials are accountable to the public and responsible for policy changes.
This accountability is undermined by a court that "goes beyond its
responsibility to protect rights and needlessly constrains political officials
in matters of policy.47
A compelling example
of excessive judicial involvement is evident in
41
Benjamin v. Jacobson. In Benjamin, the Prisoners' Rights Project of the
Legal Aid Society, on behalf of prisoners, brought suit against the City of
New York and its Board of Corrections, seeking improvement of
substandard conditions in City jails. 49 The case ultimately produced a 1978
consent decree that encompassed virtually every aspect of prison life in
New York City.5" The consent decree, a fifty-two page document that has
produced more than ninety related court orders and details more than thirty
distinct areas of prison management "reads like a manual" for jail
administration.5" The decree focuses on such areas as the maintenance of
the physical plant, food service procedures, and the proper method for
handling inmate mail.52 The prison decree is typical of others entered into
by the City in that it contains detailed and complex standards to be adhered
to by City administrators. 3
B. Enforcement Efforts
Once the parties have negotiated and signed off on the consent decree,
the courts have wide latitude to ensure the provisions of the decree are
45. Sandier & Schoenbrod, Statute PromisesLocal Relieffrom OverbearingJudges,
supra note 43, at 6.
46. See id.
47. Id.
48. 124 F.3d 162, 165 (2d Cir. 1997). This case also falls under the caption of
Benjamin v. Malcolm.
49. See Ross Sandier, The City Seeks to Regain Control over Its Jails, andReceives
Help from the Federal Court and Congress, 2 CITYLAW (Center for N.Y. City Law,
N.Y.L. Sch., New York, N.Y.), June/July 1996, at 49; see also Benjamin v. Malcolm, 75
Civ. 3073, Stipulation for Entry of Parties Final Judgment (S.D.N.Y Nov. 29, 1978).
50. See Sandler, supra note 49, at 49.

51. See id.
52. See id. at 51.
53. See, e.g., Callahan v. Carey, Index No. 42582/79 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County Aug.

8, 1981) (the decree includes requirements for bedding, storage, supervision, laundry,
group recreation, ease of entry, reception of mail, and departure and return from the

shelter, as well as stipulations for intake centers, community participation, provision of
information regarding other assistance programs, and compliance monitoring).
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being implemented.' To ensure compliance, state and federal judges have
employed various mechanisms to monitor the conduct of the City and to
ensure that the court's mandates are being carried out.5 5 Some forms of
enforcement are much less restrictive and intrusive than others, but they all
compel
some degree of judicial entanglement in legislative and executive
56
areas.
A common supervisory attempt has been the court's retention of
jurisdiction over a case when parties enter into a consent decree.5 1 This
procedural device allows the court to retain authority over the matter, to
supervise implementation of the order, and to issue directives that may be
necessary for construction, modification, termination, and enforcement of
decree provisions."
Another enforcement mechanism is the issuance of reporting
requirements, to help the court evaluate the extent to which the City is
performing its obligations under the decree.5 9 Reporting requirements have
been imposed in several institutional cases in which New York City is the
defendant.' Under some of these consent decrees, the City is required to
submit periodic reports and other documentation of its activities to a
committee, individual, plaintiff's counsel, or to the court.61
The appointment of a special master has been referred to as "[p]erhaps
the most drastic weapon in a court's compliance arsenal[,]" as it probably
more substantially impairs the City's autonomy than do other enforcement
mechanisms.63 A special master is an agent of the court who is often given

54. See Special Project, supra note 38, at 815.

55. See Lottman, supra note 39, at 69. (The court's mandates "are not self-executing,
and without adequate provisions for monitoring and insuring compliance, they will never
be fully executed.").
56. See Diver, supra note 3, at 44-45 (noting that courts typically take an
"interventionist approach").
57. See, e.g., Callahan v. Carey, Index No. 42582/79 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County Aug.

26, 1981) (The decree contains a provision granting the court continuing jurisdiction over
the case.).
58. See Lloyd C. Anderson, Release and Resumption of Jurisdictionover Consent
Decrees in StructuralReform Litigation, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 365, 402 (1987).

59. See Lottman, supra note 39, at 69.
60. See, e.g., Benjamin v. Jacobson, 124 F.3d 162 (2d Cir. 1997); Callahan, Index
No. 42582/79.
61. See, e.g., Callahan, Index No. 42582/79 (final judgment contains a provision
requiring the City to submit periodic written reports detailing its compliance or
noncompliance with the decree provisions); Benjamin v. Jacobson, 124 F.3d at 165 (the
Office of Compliance Consultants, the special master in this case, must produce quarterly
reports on all obligations under the consent decree).
62. Lottman, supra note 39, at 74.
63. See id.
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a broad range of powers, such as evaluating and supervising the City's
compliance efforts, or even assuming responsibility for implementing the
decree. 6' One of the primary functions of a special master is to gather
information to determine the extent of the City's compliance and to
recommend corrective measures where necessary.'5 As an agent of the
court, the use of a special master "contemplates a greater intrusion [than
other enforcement mechanisms] by the court into the [daily] operation[s]
of the ... institution."66
In 1982, the federal court in Benjamin established a court monitoring
agency called the Office of Compliance Consultants ("OCC") to monitor
the defendant's compliance with the 1978 consent decree governing the
City's prison system.' Referring to it as the "special master," the court
ordered the OCC to "advise and assist the [City] in achieving compliance
with the Consent Judgments and to informally assist the parties in resolving
disputes as to compliance with the Consent Judgments."6 8
The enforcement mechanism that has been the most powerful is the
court's issuance of civil contempt findings to redress the City's violations
of a decree. In some cases, contempt findings have been issued several
times in the same case, amounting to massive fines against the City.
McCain v. Koch provides an illustrative example. 69 Numerous contempt
citations have been issued in this protracted litigation attacking the City's
policies on providing emergency shelter to homeless families.7' McCain
commenced in 1983 when homeless families, relying upon various state
and federal statutory and constitutional provisions, alleged that City and
state officials failed to provide adequate emergency shelter to homeless
families. 7' In 1986, the Appellate Division enjoined the City from
sheltering homeless families with children overnight in welfare offices. 2
Since then, court orders issued by the New York State Supreme Court have
forbidden the City from keeping homeless families in its welfare offices for
more than twenty-four hours while those families' eligibility for emergency
temporary shelter is being determined.73 On several occasions, the City
and various City officials have been found guilty of violating these orders

64.

See id.

65. See Anderson, supra note 22, at 747.
66. Lottman, supra note 39, at 74.
67. See Benjamin v. Jacobson, 124 F.3d 162, 162 (1997).
68.
69.
remand,
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id.
502 N.Y.S.2d 720 (App. Div. 1986), rev'd in part, 511 N.E.2d 62 (1987), on
523 N.Y.S.2d 112 (App. Div. 1988).
See id.
See id. at 207-10.
Seeid. at 211-16.
See id.
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by continuing to shelter homeless families in welfare offices for more than
twenty-four hours.74 Contempt findings issued to redress these violations
have amounted to substantial fines for the City.75 Initial contempt fines
were set by court orders in 1992 when the City and four senior officials
were held in contempt after the City admitted several homeless families
were required to stay overnight in welfare offices during the summer and
fall of 1992.76 The fines against the City were set at a rate of $50 per
family for the first night and $100 for each additional night thereafter."
Under the 1992 orders, in addition to imposing fines, the court ordered
the offending officials to stay overnight in the welfare offices. 78 The
appellate division upheld the contempt findings and the fines against the
City but remanded the unorthodox portion of the decision directing the
officials to stay overnight in welfare offices, ordering the lower court to
impose an appropriate sanction. 79 As a result of the 1992 contempt
findings, the City was required to pay more than $5 million for violations
that occurred between September 1991 and December 1994.80 In a
subsequent order in May 1996, the City was held in civil contempt again,
and the court imposed a fine of $150 per day payable directly to homeless
families for each day after June 16, 1995 in which they were kept in offices
for more than a 24-hour wait period.81 These fines amounted to
approximately $1 million. 2 Thus, the City's contempt bill in this one case
totaled in excess of $6 million.
The foregoing example illustrates that despite the detailed nature of
consent decrees, noncompliance has remained a problem for the City.
Often, it is the magnitude of the tasks demanded which makes compliance

74. See McCain v. Dinkins, 601 N.Y.S.2d 271, 273 (App. Div. 1993), aff'd as
modified, 639 N.E.2d 1132 (1994).
75. See discussion supra notes 80-86.
76. See id.
77. See McCain v. Dinkins, 639 N.E.2d 1132, 1139 (N.Y. 1994) (noting that the
orders cover violations from September 1991 through December 1993).
78. See id. at 1135.
79. See McCain v. Dinkins, 601 N.Y.S.2d 271, 273 (App. Div. 1993), aff'd, 639
N.E.2d 1132 (1994). On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's findings,
and further held that it was not necessary to remit the proceedings to the trial court for the
imposition of replacement sanctions against the officials. In the court's view, the imposition
of civil fines against the City was a sufficient remedy to address the conduct of the officials.
See McCain, 639 N.E.2d at 1139.
80. See Matthew Goldstein, City Held in Contempt Again for Keeping Homeless in
Office, 215 N.Y. L.J., May 15, 1996, at 1.
81. See Court Orders Against the City, 2 CITYLAW (Center for N.Y. City Law,
N.Y.L. Sch., New York, N.Y.), June/July 1996, at 61.
82. See id.
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so difficult to achieve.83 Ongoing judicial oversight has served useful
purposes: remedies have been revised where necessary, and the court has
been allowed to consider the sufficiency of plans and reports required of
the defendants and has issued supplemental orders when necessary.84
However, despite these various accomplishments, continued intrusive
judicial supervision needlessly undermines local governmental institutions
that have been established to oversee government agencies. For example,
in Benjamin v. Malcolm, 5 local agencies instituted to oversee and govern
conditions in various institutions have at times relinquished their functions
to state and federal courts.8 6 The New York City Charter provides for the
establishment of a Board of Corrections and grants it the authority to
"establish minimum standards for care, custody, correction, treatment,
supervision, and discipline of all persons held or confined under the
jurisdiction of the corrections department."'8 7 Yet due to the existence of
the prison consent decree, the board has postponed action on disputed
issues in some cases, waiting until the court has taken action, rather than
making decisions based on its own experience and authority. 8
C. Ability of Elected Officials to Change and Develop Policy
When the court becomes intimately involved in reforming social
institutions, it assumes responsibilities that are delegated to other branches
of government. 89 The separation-of-powers doctrine mandates that
sensitivity be employed when a court seeks to implement, modify, or
enforce the decrees for which they assume responsibility. While a court
clearly has the authority to strike down policies that contravene
constitutional or statutory norms, such a right does not extend to the ability
of courts to "fashion wide-ranging relief that substitutes the [court's] views
of policy, or those of a litigant, for those of the [legislative] and the
executive branch officials."' The New York State Constitution and the

83. See Sandier & Schoenbrod, Government by Decree, supra note 15, at 55.
84. See Special Project, supra note 38, at 816.
85. 495 F. Supp 1357 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
86. See Implementationof the PrisonLitigationReform Act of 1995: HearingsBefore
the U.S. Senate Judicary Comm., 102d Cong., (1996) (statement of Laura A. Chamberlain,
Assistant Corporation Counsel, on behalf of the City of New York) [hereinafter Hearings
on the Implementationof the PrisonLitigationReform Act].
87. N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 25 § 626(e) (1989).
88. See Hearings on the Implementation of the PrisonLitigation Reform Act, supra

note 86 (statement of Laura A. Chamberlain).

89. See Demers, supra note 10, at 1012.

90. Id.
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New York City Charter clearly reserves such policy-making authority for
the executive and legislative branches of government. 9'
The broad nature of consent decrees and court orders, however, often
perpetuate the preferences and priorities of former elected officials and
counsels that decision-making in the future be exercised in a particular
fashion. 92 The ability of elected officials to implement changes is often
restricted by consent decree obligations that may have been entered into
years before the official took office. 93 Specifically, the demands imposed
often limit the discretion of elected officials who have been entrusted with
the responsibility for creating laws and instituting policies to manage the
City as they see fit.94
An administration's inability to change City policy often stems from
the problems entailed in modifying or vacating a consent decree, which is
frequently a "labor-intensive, document intensive, costly and often
frustrating process."I In some instances, City agencies have had to engage
in long, drawn out procedural motion practices with plaintiffs, instead of
managing the institutions they were established to govern. 96 Although
decrees are supposed to be terminated when the City achieves compliance,
some decrees have spanned decades.97 This has made it extremely difficult
for City government to develop innovative solutions to both old and new
problems. 9s
Problems of this nature were encountered in Callahan v. Carey,99 a
case that produced a decree requiring the City to provide free shelter for

91. See N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 1; see also N.Y. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
92. See Sandier & Schoenbrod, Government by Decree, supra note 15, at 56-58
(discussing the manner in which decrees bind future administrations).
93. See id. at 54.
94. See John B. Weiner, InstitutionalReform ConsentDecreesas Conserversof Social
Progress, 27 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 355, 363 (1996).
95. Hearings on the Implementation of the PrisonLitigation Reform Act, supra note
86 (statement of Laura A. Chamberlain).

96. See id.
97. See, e.g., Callahan v. Carey, Index No. 42582/79 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County, Aug.
8, 1981) (this decree has been in effect since 1978). Compliance has been difficult to
achieve primarily because courts often "underestimate the sheer magnitude of the tasks
demanded[,]" and because the level of political support may be insufficient to ensure that
the decree is followed. Sandler & Schoenbrod, Government by Decree, supra note 15, at

55.
98. See Sandier & Schoenbrod, Statute Promises Local Relief from Overbearing
Judges, supra note 43, at 6.
99. See generally Callahan, Index No. 42582/79 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County Aug. 8,
1981).
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the homeless.' °° Today, the City's ability to improve its policy towards the
homeless "in a deliberative and rational manner [has] been impeded by the
need to respond to frequent motions for enforcement of [c]onsent [d]ecree
provisions."'°' In essence, the homeless have suffered as a result of the
decree formulated to help them, because "[d]etermining what types of
facilities and programs would truly meet the needs of residents of adult
shelters [have] become a lower priority than ensuring that, for example,
there were forty toilets working in the Fort Washington Armory." 2
Despite the difficulties of breaking free from decades-old consent
decrees, recently the City has been working diligently to free itself from
these "costly, outdated commitments."103 The City conducted a review of
all current consent decrees, with the aim of attempting to establish that, in
some instances, modification of existing decrees is warranted in light of a
significant change in circumstances since the decrees were established. "0
In 1992, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that modification of a decree
would only be granted if the City could establish that a "significant change
in the circumstances warrants revision of the decree" and that the
"proposed modification is suitably tailored to the changed
circumstances."15 However, compliance has remained an "elusive goal"
and many orders, some of which date back to the 1970s,
06 have proven
difficult if not impossible to comply with or to terminate. 1
Some recent efforts to modify consent decrees, however, have resulted
in noteworthy changes for the City. In 1996, because the court found a
sufficient change in circumstances to allow summary eviction proceedings
under the City's "Bawdy House Law," the City was granted its request to
modify a then twenty-five-year-old consent decree governing eviction
procedures in public housing. 0 7 This ruling allows for a quicker removal
of tenants who use their apartments to engage in drug trafficking.' Under
a 1971 consent decree, the Housing Authority had been required to engage
in a two-step eviction proceeding that typically lasted between eight months

100. See id. Using an equal protection analysis, the consent decree was later made

applicable to homeless women in 1983. See Eldredge v. Koch, 469 N.Y.S.2d 744 (App.
Div. 1983).
101. Demers, supra note 10, at 1021.
102. Id.
103. Deborah Pines, City Takes Aim at Long-Standing Consent Decrees, 215 N.Y.
L.J., Feb. 7, 1996, at 1.

104. See id.
105. Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 383 (1992).
106. See Sandier & Schoenbrod, Government by Decree, supra note 15, at 57.
107.
1996).
108.

See Escalera v. New York City Hous. Auth., 924 F. Supp. 1323 (S.D.N.Y.
See id.
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and two years.1 9 In the 1996 decision, U.S. District Court Judge Loretta
Preska cited the escalation of violence related to the unanticipated
proliferation of crack cocaine use as a reasonable basis for allowing the
Housing Authority to expedite evictions of drug-trafficking tenants. 0 The
court reasoned that its decision would allow it to satisfy its obligation to
provide decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings for low-income families.",
The City also won several modifications to the 1978 consent decree in
Benjamin."2 In an effort to reduce gang-related violence in prisons, the
City sought to prohibit gang-identifying jewelry and was successful in
modifying the portion of the decree that permits prisoners to wear
jewelry." 3' The consent order was also modified to allow for a revised food
preparation protocol that was renegotiated by the City and the Legal Aid
Society (on behalf of the prisoners) in March 1996."' Under an earlier
order entered into in the late 1980s, the City had been required to
implement a costly food preparation method." 5 This order was the result
of efforts aimed at improving insufficient food services and below quality
food standards." 6 The modification benefits the City because the new food
preparation requirements are much less expensive than those in existence
under the prior order." 7
Further modification of the prison consent orders was achieved in April
1996 when the City was granted a motion to allow in-cell library privileges
for the most violent inmates. 118 The 1978 consent decree had required that
prisoners be provided with congregate law library privileges. " 9 However,
Judge Harold Baer, Jr., the federal judge in charge of supervising the
consent decree, found that the levels of violence in prison law libraries had
not been anticipated at the time the decree was entered into, and thus
suspension of congregate law library privileges was warranted for the most
violent inmates.'20

109. See Bill Alden, Modification of 1971 Consent Decree Granted, N.Y. L.J., Apr.
22, 1996, at 1.
110. See Escalera, 924 F. Supp at 1340-41.
111. See id. at 1345.

112. Benjamin v. Malcolm, 495 F. Supp. 1357 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
113. See Benjamin v. Jacobson, No. 75 CIV. 3073, 1995 WL 378529, Supplemental
Order Re: Gang Jewelry (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 1995).
114. See Benjamin v. Jacobson, Supplemental Order Re: Food Service (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 2, 1995); see also Sandler, supra note 49.
115.

See Hearingson the Implementation of the PrisonLitigation Reform Act, supra

note 86 (statement of Laura A. Chamberlain).
116.
117.

See id.
Seeid.

118.

See Benjamin v. Jacobson, 923 F. Supp. 517, 518 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).

119.

See id.

120. See id. at 521-22.

1252

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOLLAWREVIEW

[Vol. 42

The City's most monumental (albeit short-lived) achievement occurred
on July 23, 1996, when the City briefly won back the management of its
jail system.12 1 In 1978, the City had entered into a consent decree which
placed most aspects of the City's jail system under federal court
supervision." z In response to a motion filed by the City, Judge Baer
vacated a series of consent decrees stemming from the initial 1978 decree,
which had governed the prison system for nearly twenty years.'13 The
court found the decision was mandated by the Prison Litigation Reform Act
of 1995,124 which required termination of the decrees unless there were
current ongoing constitutional violations."Z The City's victory in this area
did not last long. On August 26, 1997, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit reversed the district court's ruling, and in essence held that
New York City jails should continue to be managed by the federal decrees
dating back to 1978.126 The court of appeals held that although the Prison
Litigation Reform Act may have terminated the federal court's authority to
27
enforce the consent decrees, the decrees were still binding on the parties,
and thus plaintiffs "should be able to get all the relief from state courts.
*. that had previously
been available to them federally under the [c]onsent
28
[dlecrees."1
D. Reordering of Budgetary Expenditures & Allocation of Resources
Implementing the reforms ordered in a consent decree forces the courts
to assume a legislative role-the process of resource allocation. 29 Unlike
the City Council, the court is unable to engage in a debate about how the
City should use its limited funds. 30 Through the issuance of its orders, the
court is able to place a particular policy at the top of the budgetary list, so

121. See Benjamin v. Jacobson, 935 F. Supp 332 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 124 F.3d 162 (2d Cir. 1997) (reversing portion of the decision requiring that
the consent decree be vacated).
122. See Benjamin, 935 F. Supp. at 337.
123. See id.
124. See Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, § 802 (to be
codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3626 as amended).
125. See Benjamin, 935 F. Supp. at 357.
126. See Benjamin, 124 F.3d 162, 164-65 (2d Cir. 1997).
127. The court's rationale was that the underlying contract in the consent decree
remained intact. See id. at 178.
128. Id.
129. See Jack Weinstein, The Effect of Austerity on InstitutionalLitigation, 6 L. &
HUM. BEHAV. 145, 150 (1988).
130. See Sandier & Schoenbrod, Government by Decree, supra note 15, at 57.
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what had once been an option can become a priority.13 ' As one
commentator has argued, "[t]he courts are, in effect, requiring the
appropriation of funds by the legislature, because sufficient
funding must
132
be budgeted to respond to court imposed solutions.
The implementation and supervision of consent and court decrees often
require considerable expenditures, making institutional reform litigation an
increasingly costly process for the City. Some 3consent
decree requirements
34
3
cost City taxpayers millions of dollars a year.1 As noted in Callahan,1
for example, the City at one point spent in excess of $170 million a year
to comply with the decree requirements that it provide shelter for the
homeless. 135 Although the judiciary does not have the authority to require
the appropriation of local funds, in essence, its court-ordered mandates
indirectly compel some
expenditures136-at times up to millions of dollars
37
1
of local tax funds.
IV. CONCLUSION
Consent decrees have become a powerful mechanism for the
enforcement of constitutional and statutory norms, through which New
York City residents have won judicial protection for many existing rights
and privileges.138 When entering into a consent decree, both sides hope
that the parties can come to an agreement in which the goals of the decree
have been satisfied. 139 However, this goal has generally eluded the City of
New York. 14' The difficulty of enforcing these comprehensive decrees
raises serious doubts about the utility and desirability of litigation as a
means of reforming government institutions. As long as such cases continue
to rise, however, courts must consider how their powers can be employed
most effectively to implement institutional change. This is especially the
case when one considers that the "involvement of the court and judge in

131. See id.
132. Demers, supra note 10, at 1048.
133. See Hearings on the Implementation of the PrisonLitigation Reform Act, supra
note 86 (statement of Laura A. Chamberlain) (noting that in Benjamin v. Jacobson, the City
spent over $2 million dollars a year in compliance monitoring alone).
134. Callahan v. Carey, Index No. 42582/79 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County Aug. 8, 1981).
135. See Demers, supra note 10, at 1020.
136. See Eisenberg & Yeazell, supra note 44, at 506.
137. See Demers, supra note 10, at 1017.
138. See supra notes 5-10 and accompanying text.
139. See Anderson, supra note 58, at 403.
140. See Sandier & Schoenbrod, Government by Decree, supra note 15, at 56.
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[institutional reform litigation] is workable and indeed
inevitable if justice
1 41
is to be done in an increasingly regulated society."
As the above examples illustrate, the courts have become entangled in
the policy-making and discretionary functions of the legislative and
executive branches of City government. At times there are clearly
legitimate reasons for judicial intervention in City policy-making. 42 The
43
protection of constitutional rights is one of the most compelling reasons. 1
However, despite the necessity of heightened judicial interest in
institutional reform, the courts should not completely take control of the
reform effort from the parties. Instead, "courts should defer to local
institutions to the maximum extent [possible], consistent with [their]
primary judicial function of enforcing the Constitution." 4 4 In addition to
the asserted rights of a particular plaintiff, a court faced with an
institutional suit should consider the fundamental right of voters to elect
officials who will have the ability to deal with important social programs
and problems. 145 Taxpayers expect accountable leadership. True leadership
means not allowing misguided policies of the past to dictate the future of
the City.
Tamia Perry

141. Chayes, supra note 27, at 1281.
142. See Sandier & Schoenbrod, Government by Decree, supra note 15, at 56.
143. See id.
144. Special Project, supra note 38, at 815.
145. See Sandier & Schoenbrod, Statute Promises Local Relief from Overbearing
Judges, supra note 43, at 6.

